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I. Introduction:  
 Military intervention is a prospect that carries both great potential for good and terrible 
possibilities for destruction. The application of military force is utilized by both regional and 
global powers, with wide-reaching implications. While the United States has repeatedly chosen 
to deploy the military in crisis situations around the globe since World War II, its actions have 
not always achieved the desired results or have had unintended consequences that undermine US 
security or foreign policy objectives. Amid calls for a reevaluation of the process leading to 
intervention, many experts look to international law and the international community to guide the 
response to this evolving norm. One critical element to the future of this debate is the standards 
set forth by the Responsibility to Protect (R2P), an emerging norm backed by the UN as a 
framework to manage crises that could demand international intervention. This paper will 
examine the cases of past interventions and seek to determine better guidance to the future of 
implementing military intervention.  
 This paper will discuss the history of the United States’ involvement in intervention since 
the end of World War II and explain the history and implications of the Responsibility to Protect. 
Then, it will shift to examining modern crises and policies and examine the cases of Syria and 
Libya in 2014. These parallel situations offer a unique focus on the process of authorizing 
intervention, as international action was supported in the case of Libya, but remains absent in the 
case of Syria. Next, this paper will shift to examining the intervention in Iraq in 2014, where the 
US chose to conduct airstrikes with the consent and support of the Iraqi government to protect 
civilians from annihilation. Finally, this paper will conclude with suggestions for reform and 
offer policy recommendations for the handling of future crises that may involve military 
intervention.  
II. Background: 
History of US involvement in intervention 
The US has consistently utilized troops or bombed other nations to achieve national 
security objectives. Table 1 below provides a lengthy, yet non-comprehensive, list of instances 
after World War II in which the US has used either troops or bombs to affect outcomes within 
other sovereign nations. The consistency of US action necessitates a careful evaluation of how 
the US proceeds and chooses to engage in conflict. While the nature and motivation for 
intervention may have shifted over time, it is essential to study these instances and to determine 
the effectiveness of US-backed interventions. The repeated military involvement also appears to 
have become more protracted in more modern conflicts, making each new crisis significant as 
the possibility of perpetual warfare looms. There is rarely a stated doctrine or policy that guides 
the decisions to intervene, and embracing an international norm such as the Responsibility to 
Protect (R2P) could help to guide and inform future decisions. This paper will focus on the most 
modern conflicts that have challenged the US in an effort to offer the most relevant analysis and 
advice for the future of US military intervention.  
 
Table 1: Table of US interventions 1945-2017: 
COUNTRY YEAR ACTION 
CHINA 1945 Troops 
CHINA 1948-49 Troops 
KOREA 1950-53 Troops 
GUATEMALA 1954 Bombing 
EGYPT 1956 Troops 
LEBANON 1958 Troops, naval 
PANAMA 1958 Troops 
THAILAND 1962 Troops 
VIETNAM 1964-73 Troops, bombing 
PANAMA 1964 Troops 
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC 1965 Troops, bombing 
CAMBODIA 1970 Bombing, troops, naval 
LAOS 1971-73 Command operation, bombing 
CAMBODIA 1975 Troops, bombing 
EL SALVADOR 1981 Command operation, troops 
LEBANON 1982-83 Naval, bombing, troops 
GRENADA 1983-84 Troops, bombing 
HONDURAS 1983-89 Troops 
LIBYA 1986 Bombing, naval 
BOLIVIA 1986 Troops 
IRAN 1987-88 Naval, bombing 
PANAMA 1989-90 Troops, bombing 
LIBERIA 1990 Troops 
SAUDI ARABIA 1990-91 Troops, jets 
IRAQ 1990-91 Bombing, troops, naval 
KUWAIT 1991 Naval, bombing, troops 
IRAQ 1991-93 Bombing, naval 
SOMALIA 1992-95 Troops, naval, bombing 
BOSNIA 1993- Bombing 
MACEDONIA 1994 Troops 
HAITI 1994 Troops, naval 
ZAIRE (CONGO) 1996 Troops 
LIBERIA 1996 Troops 
ALBANIA 1997 Troops 
SUDAN 1998 Missiles 
AFGHANISTAN 1998 Missiles 
IRAQ 1998 Bombing, Missiles 
YUGOSLAVIA 1999 Bombing, Missiles 
MACEDONIA 2001 Troops 
EAST TIMOR 2001-2012 Troops 
AFGHANISTAN 2001- Troops, bombing, missiles 
IRAQ 2003-11 Troops, naval, bombing, missiles 
LIBERIA 2003 Troops 
HAITI 2004-05 Troops, naval   
PAKISTAN 2005- Bombing, Missiles 
SOMALIA 2006- Missiles, naval, troops, command operation 
YEMEN 2009- Missiles, command operation 
LIBYA 2011- Bombing, missiles, troops, command operation 
IRAQ 2014- Bombing, missiles, troops, command operation 
SYRIA 2014- Bombing, missiles, troops, command operation 
Source: Torreon, Barbara. 2016. Instances of Use of United States Armed Forces Abroad, 
1798-2016. Congressional Research Service. 
  
The Limitations of the Responsibility to Protect and the Necessary Reforms 
 The modern world has brought with it new challenges and conflicts that require creative 
and dynamic responses. US foreign policy must examine the current institutions and determine 
how they may guide future intervention efforts. To uphold the humanitarian ideals universally 
embraced by the international community, current institutions and policies must be either 
reinforced or updated to answer the challenges of today. The current system of international 
governance has failed to bring about the global peace and stability promised. As a result, 
international questions of legality, justice, and responsibility and the structures designed to 
preserve these ideals must be reexamined. This is one area that the US may be able to guide 
positive change and stronger enforcement. One of the greatest and most urgent of these 
challenges is addressing the international community’s responsibility to prevent mass atrocities. 
Similar assessments of policy in the past on humanitarian intervention led to the development of 
the Responsibility to Protect as an advanced framework to prevent future losses of life. However, 
this international norm has not fully addressed the complex challenge presented by the reality of 
global crises and necessitates new thinking and the development of the next phase of 
humanitarian intervention. By examining the cases of the Libyan Revolution of 2011, the Syrian 
uprisings of the same year, and the US military intervention in Iraq in 2014, this paper seeks to 
identify the challenges faced by humanitarian intervention efforts through the mandate of the 
Responsibility to Protect, and to suggest an improved framework for future interventions that the 
US may be able to implement. These instances must be examined through the lens of the current 
humanitarian interventionist framework to recognize inconsistencies and possibilities for 
improvement. After recognizing and weighing the challenges, the next step is to develop what 
additional elements need to be added to a new framework and identify refined and effective 
criteria for humanitarian intervention that can serve to better prevent the conflicts that threaten 
the conscience of the world while providing a legitimate and effective method for implementing 
intervention.  
History of the Development of Humanitarian Intervention and the Responsibility to Protect 
 The tragic incidents of ethnic cleansing and genocide of the 1990s that occurred in the 
Balkans and especially in Rwanda challenged the international community to develop procedures 
of collective response when crises arise involving gross and widespread human rights violations. 
In trying to fulfill the United Nations’ potential as peacekeeper and international arbiter, Kofi 
Annan, in the United Nations 2000 Millennium report, asked: "If humanitarian intervention is, 
indeed, an unacceptable assault on sovereignty, how should we respond to a Rwanda, to a 
Srebrenica, to gross and systematic violation of human rights that offend every precept of our 
common humanity?” (Annan 2000). As a response to these challenges, the Canadian 
Government set up the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) 
in December of 2001. This commission developed the idea of the Responsibility to Protect 
(R2P), which outlined a new set of criteria to lay the foundation for cases of intervention.  This 
document set the standard for intervention to include “serious and irreparable harm occurring to 
human beings, or imminently likely to occur” involving “large scale loss of life” or “large scale 
‘ethnic cleansing’” (Report on ICISS 2001). This report continues to outline the precautionary 
principles including right intention, last resort, proportional means, and reasonable prospects of 
success (Report on ICISS 2001). These standards were established to strengthen, if not to ensure, 
both the legitimacy and effectiveness of future humanitarian interventions. The dangers of states 
using a humanitarian premise to advance their national or specific interests was not lost on the 
developers of this report, but it still remains a challenge that undermines the effectiveness of the 
R2P (Thakur 2013). 
 The UN adopted the norm of the Responsibility to Protect in 2005 at the World Summit. 
A norm is "a standard of appropriate behavior for actors given identity,” and states are often 
allowed to interpret them loosely (Shawki 2011). This adoption is simply the first stage of 
reforming the structure of forceful humanitarian responses. It does not include an effective 
enforcement mechanism and also involved the alteration of some of the language and criteria 
from the 2001 report. In the version adopted by the 2005 World Summit, the United Nations 
Security Council (UNSC), consisting of the five permanent members US, Russia, China, France, 
and the UK, as well as 10 non-permanent members, was granted exclusive control of military 
force, and the crimes necessitating intervention were restricted to genocide, war crimes, crimes 
against humanity, and ethnic cleansing. Criteria to determine the appropriateness of intervention 
were removed, and the language regarding loss of legitimacy was changed to offending states 
“manifestly failing to protect” the population (2005 World Summit). These changes weakened 
the original framework, serving to limit its effective application while simultaneously charging 
the UN with upholding the ideals that the design was established to enforce. 
a) What is the Responsibility to Protect? 
  The final language of the Responsibility to Protect stipulates that the international 
community is: 
 
…prepared to take collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the 
Security Council, in accordance with the Charter, including Chapter VII, on a 
case-by-case basis and in cooperation with relevant regional organizations as 
appropriate, should peaceful means be inadequate and national authorities are 
manifestly failing to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic 
cleansing and crimes against humanity” (World Summit Outcome 2005). 
 
 The structure outlined first by the ICISS and later embraced by the UN consists of three 
pillars designed to achieve this mandate of protection. With the first pillar, the state “carries the 
primary responsibility for protecting populations from genocide, war crimes, crimes against 
humanity and ethnic cleansing, and their incitement” (Responsibility 2014). This language is 
designed to redefine state sovereignty and include the necessity of states to respect the human 
rights of its own populace. The design of the framework encourages states to give stronger 
consideration to any action that may result in international censure, as other state actors may 
become involved in later steps. In the second pillar, “the international community has a 
responsibility to encourage and assist States in fulfilling this responsibility” (Responsibility 
2014). The second pillar demonstrates the importance of states considering the global 
responsibility to protect those who are threatened and may be powerless or severely limited to 
stand up against oppression or aggressive government action. This charges states with valuing 
the preservation and upholding of human rights above national interests. Finally, the third pillar 
asserts that “the international community has a responsibility to encourage and assist States in 
fulfilling this responsibility” (Responsibility 2014). The language of this pillar continues to 
outline the subsequent actions that may be taken during applicable crises as the international 
community “has a responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian, and other means to 
protect populations from these crimes. If a state is manifestly failing to protect its populations, 
the international community must be prepared to take collective action to protect populations, in 
accordance with the UN Charter” (Responsibility 2014). This responsibility begins with the state 
and its national government, but its failure in this respect shifts responsibility to the international 
community. This idea is reinforced by the argument that states are permitted to use force in 
extraordinary circumstances and when the situation calls for quick and forceful action to avert 
imminent atrocities. 
b) The Importance and Application of R2P 
 The principles outlined by the R2P mark an adjustment in how humanitarian intervention 
and state sovereignty is discussed. The fundamental development of this new ideal is the shifting 
perspective on the status of state sovereignty. The new doctrine argues for an original 
interpretation where the “essence of sovereignty is responsibility, not control” (Evans 2002). The 
reality of the old accepted structure of the international system is “dangerously out of step with 
international realities” (Evans 2002). The new system for thinking about this issue could 
potentially serve as the most significant alteration in the understanding of sovereignty since the 
establishment of the state system in 1648. While this may sound drastic, the international 
community has unanimously recognized the need to update current norms to prevent future 
atrocities. The R2P marks a major paradigm shift and reconceptualization of state sovereignty as 
conditional rather than absolute and requiring states to meet the requirements and responsibilities 
of sovereignty (Shawki 2011). Failing to meet these standards must result in international 
pressure, and if all other tactics do not realize the necessary alterations, then forceful 
humanitarian intervention to limit human suffering must be a potential response. 
c) Challenges of the Political and Selective Application of R2P  
 While the language adopted by the UN calls for unity on this issue, the structure and 
political reality of the UN is responsible for failures to intervene and uphold its responsibilities. 
The UN Security Council can become deadlocked and be paralyzed against action if any member 
nation chooses to veto a resolution calling for an international effort or coalition to address a 
crisis. In addition, the R2P did not advance far enough or have the necessary enforcement 
capability to result in the successful application of the norm. While there are cases that clearly 
require an international response, R2P has not consistently been applied. Elements of R2P have 
been referenced in actions taken in Sudan, Libya, the Ivory Coast, and the Central African 
Republic. The closest to full implementation of the R2P took place in Libya, but while the 
motivation may have qualified for intervention under these standards, the UNSC was hesitant to 
explicitly justify actions through the espousal of R2P (Responsibility 2014). The inconsistent 
application of intervention has given credence to the idea that interventions are often justified 
under false pretenses and are only carried out when there are other benefits or interests at stake. 
This has undermined the truly crucial aspect of humanitarian intervention that is necessary for 
intervention to be seriously considered by state actors and international organizations. 
d) Humanitarian intervention under false pretenses  
The norm of R2P is still developing, and there are concerns that the new elements of 
international action may not be applied for the original intended purpose of the legitimization of 
humanitarian action. There are fears that the justifications of R2P could be used to advance 
political objectives or imperialistic goals (Shawki 2011). One potential criticism is that behind 
the “noble principles” guiding intervention, the justifications for interventions merely act as 
“cloaks for hegemonic interests” (Thakur 2013). These potential pitfalls of the framework have 
worked against the true support of the international community, especially with respect to the 
third pillar that shifts the responsibility to the UN and the nations of the world and authorizes 
forceful intervention. 
e) Lack of enforcement mechanisms  
 Despite some advances and the adoption of R2P at the World Summit, R2P has not 
developed into international humanitarian law and is therefore not binding. This effectively 
results in a hollow framework that fails to provide protection and live up to the responsibility 
inherently mandated in the document. The failures to intervene in clear crisis situations such as 
the ones in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Darfur, and now most recently in Syria have 
undoubtedly weakened the authority and principles R2P (Western & Goldstein 2011). The norm 
needs nations to endorse it in order to advance its acceptance and adherence within the 
international community. This is one area that US action could drive change on a global scale by 
fully embracing either R2P or the principles behind it.  
f) Lack of commitment to state building 
 Apparent weaknesses of R2P become evident when examining how the international 
community has withdrawn after suffering limited casualties that generate widespread criticism. 
U.S. forces were involved in the October 1993 Battle of Mogadishu, also referred to as the 
“Black Hawk Down” incident, where 18 U.S. soldiers were killed in an operation and one of the 
operator’s bodies was dragged through the streets of Mogadishu. Confronted with domestic 
pressure as well as an unclear objective to the American people, President Clinton withdrew the 
U.S. troops in Somalia. The UN followed suit, and Somalia was left to devolve into what is 
today a failed state (Western & Goldstein 2011). The unwillingness of international actors to act 
when vital strategic interests are not at stake threatens the effectiveness of the R2P and the future 
of humanitarian intervention as a tool for global governance. The commitment to intervention is 
also a commitment to state building on some level, as the aftermath of intervention must be 
handled to facilitate and create a stable society. 
 The cases of the intervention in Libya in 2011 and the continuing lack of intervention in 
Syria clearly demonstrate all of the issues discussed above. With the case of Libya, criticisms of 
intervention for imperial purposes and the lack of commitment to state building resulted in the 
ultimate failure of the effort. In Syria, the flaws of the veto system of the UNSC, Russian 
intervention for geopolitical interests, a lack of enforcement capability or mechanisms all 
contributed to the resulting humanitarian disaster. The case of Iraq in 2014 offers a more 
successful application of humanitarian intervention, and offers some guidance on how to best 
implement humanitarian missions. After giving a brief history of the events of these cases, this 
paper will present a new framework that seeks to address the weaknesses of R2P and suggests 
new ideas for the future of intervention. 
III. Case Studies: 
History of Libyan Uprisings and Revolution in 2011 
 The Libyan Revolution began in January of 2011 following uprisings in Tunisia and 
Egypt. By late February, the situation in Libya was identified as a critical security situation with 
worries of significant abuses of human rights and loss of life. On February 25th, the UN Human 
Rights Commissioner Navi Pillay stressed the urgency of the situation and referenced 
independent reports that “thousands may have been killed or injured” and the reported use of 
tanks, helicopters, and aircraft on protesters (Libyan Crackdown ‘Escalates’ 2011). Colonel 
Muammar al-Gaddafi, then President of Libya, deployed troops to suppress the protests, and 
fomented an armed rebellion that resulted in over 1,000 deaths within the first few weeks of the 
uprisings (Libyan Crackdown ‘Escalates’ 2011).  
 This state-led violence led the adoption of Resolution 1970 by the UN Security Council 
on the 26th of February, which made an explicit reference to the responsibility to protect 
(Responsibility 2014). The rapidly escalating crisis was reported to have generated nearly 
100,000 refugees within only one week with large flows into the neighboring countries of Egypt 
and Tunisia to escape the violence, according to the UN refugee agency. U.N. High 
Commissioner for Refugees Antonio Guterres, now Secretary General of the UN, asked the 
international community to provide assistance to cope with the "humanitarian emergency." 
Specifically, the U.N. reported that Tunisia recorded the entry of 40,000 people from Libya since 
February 20, and Egypt recorded 55,000 people crossing the Libyan border since February 19 
(Libya Civil War 2011). By March 8th, Qaddafi’s use of “heavy weapons against civilians,” the 
employment of foreign mercenaries against his own people, and the rejection of humanitarian aid 
packages all resulted in international pressure and calls to end Qaddafi’s regime (Shaheen 2011). 
The crisis continued to mount, and by March 15th, the UN reported 300,000 refugees resulting 
from the conflict (Libya UN Refugee Agency 2011). 
 At this point, Western powers were considering what action to take to defuse the 
mounting crisis. The UN demonstrated its potential to act in the midst of crisis and to plan a 
response to the threats to the civilian population. Chapter VII of the UN Charter provides a 
framework for the Security Council to authorize the use of force. The Security Council can 
“determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression” and 
take both military and nonmilitary action to “restore international peace and security” 1973 
(“Security Council authorizes ‘all necessary’ 2011). This was the justification for the UN statute 
that France, the United Kingdom, and Lebanon cited for the proposal to adopt United Nations 
Security Council Resolution 1973 (“Security Council authorizes ‘all necessary’ 2011). The vote 
on UNSCR 1973 provided the legal basis for military intervention in the Libyan Revolution by 
first demanding an immediate ceasefire, and then authorizing the international community to 
enforce a no-fly zone—approving “all necessary measures to protect civilians and civilian 
populated areas” (Security Council Approves 'No-Fly Zone' 2011). With Resolution 1973, the 
UN had passed a “blanket resolution” authorizing the use of force in order to protect civilians. 
For the first time, limitations on the scope or the duration of a mission authorizing the use of 
force were not specified. Thus, NATO air power was almost immediately deployed in 
compliance with the mandate of the UNSC to “protect the civilian population” (Protection of 
Civilians – France ONU 2015). 
 There was some effort by Qaddafi to comply with international calls for peace after the 
action of the international community and the adoption of Resolution 1973, and on March 18th, 
he formally accepted a ceasefire. The effectiveness of this ceasefire came into question as reports 
from refugees indicated that government forces never stopped advancing on the southern 
outskirts of Benghazi as well as on the rebel city of Ajdabiyah (Rebels: Assaulted 2011).  Also, 
despite the Libyan government’s declaration of a ceasefire, attacks continued (Libya declared 
ceasefire 2011). 
 After a sustained international effort involving the implementation of a no-fly zone and 
bombings by NATO forces, the Libyan regime collapsed in October 2011 as Gaddafi was 
extrajudicially killed by rebel fighters. The UN voted to end the authorization and thus the 
operation shortly thereafter on October 27th (UN Security Council Vote 2011). Since this 
overthrow, civil war and competing factions have split the country and the conflict has yet to be 
resolved. Despite calls from the National Transitional Council (NTC) to continue the UN and 
NATO operation, the mission to protect the population was deemed to be fulfilled, and 
operations were concluded (UN Security Council Vote 2011). Currently, the NTC has been 
unable to unify the various factions within the country that are contesting for power.  
History of Syrian Conflict 
 The Syrian revolution began in March 2011, only two months after the uprising in Libya. 
Peaceful protests calling for the fall of the regime were quickly met with violence by the 
government of President Bashar al-Assad. The death toll was slower to mount in Syria than it 
was in Libya, but from the beginning of protests in March to the end of May, the death toll was 
estimated to be between 850 and 1,000 by May of 2011, with over 10,000 refugees fleeing the 
conflict (Adams 2015). Similar to the situation that developed in Libya, the Assad government 
deployed tanks against a largely unarmed civilian population and began shelling towns, resulting 
in civilian casualties (US Policy on Syria 2011, Syria Profile – Timeline 2016). 
Following the escalation of government violence and military campaigns, the once 
peaceful protestors resorted to violent counter-attacks and formed the Free Syrian Army in July 
of 2011. In August, violence mounted and the U.S. began calling for President Bashar al-Assad 
to step aside (Macon 2011). President Assad refused to step down, and the violence increased 
dramatically in 2012, with an escalation of the casualties in Syria from approximately 1,000 per 
month to approximately 5,000 per month as the civil war spread. The failure to prevent this 
intensification of the conflict resulted in the death toll from the conflict rising from 5,000 to 
almost 60,000 between February and November of 2012 (Adams 2015). Other sources placed the 
death toll at closer to 40,000, as a result of the conflict with 400,000 additional people displaced 
(Abedine and Brumfield 2012). The conflict in Syria continued to degenerate with the use of 
chemical weapons on civilians in August of 2013. Hundreds of people were killed after rockets 
filled with the nerve agent sarin were fired at several suburbs of Damascus. Several Western 
governments and rulers accused Syria's government of perpetrating the attack, but the 
government blamed rebel forces (Syria – Story of the Conflict 2016). By the end of 2013, the 
number of dead had risen to at least 125,000, with over a third if the casualties being civilians. 
The actual figure may have been significantly higher, as Syrian Observatory for Human Rights 
believes (Solomon 2013).  
 By the end of 2014, the UN Human Rights Council’s Commission of Inquiry (CoI) had 
published nine major reports documenting gross human rights abuses committed in Syria. The 
CoI has claimed that pro-government forces “continue to conduct widespread attacks on 
civilians, systematically committing murder, torture, rape and enforced disappearance as crimes 
against humanity” and have also committed extensive war crimes. The CoI also reported on war 
crimes committed by various armed opposition groups, including “murder, execution without 
due process, torture, hostage taking,” as well as widespread violations of international 
humanitarian law (Adams 2015). Peace talks and negotiations continue, but these efforts have 
failed to bring a resolution to the crisis in Syria. 
Comparisons of Cases for Intervention 
 When examining these two crises and the different international responses, the 
discrepancy and lack of continuity when responding to crises becomes apparent. The comparison 
raises the question of why the US and the international community perceived a clear 
humanitarian crisis in Libya followed rapidly with intervention, while almost simultaneously 
failing to give the situation in Syria such clear recognition. This clear failure must be analyzed 
and understood to inform future US intervention efforts and avoid similar catastrophes in the 
future. 
 The Responsibility to Protect played a significant role in the decision to intervene in 
Libya, and the criteria to justify intervention under this developing norm is essential to 
understand the evolving and current state of R2P. As early as February 22nd of 2011, the UN 
High Commissioner for Human Rights, Navi Pillay, declared that attacks against the Libyan 
people were both “widespread and systematic” (Nebehay 2011). By February 26th the United 
Nations Security Council had referred the case to the International Criminal Court (ICC) for 
crimes against humanity, all the while emphasizing Libya’s responsibility to protect its citizens 
(Cotler, et. al 2011). Reports of massive casualties began to appear in headlines across the world, 
and the international community began to worry about the potential devastation of failing to 
address such a rapidly developing and seemingly violent conflict. In February of 2011, the ICC 
estimated the number of deaths in Libya to be 10,000 and the number of wounded to be 4,000. 
The World Health Organization estimated approximately 2,000 killed by March 2nd, while the 
opposition claimed that the number was closer to 6,500. Other reports estimated around 8,000 
deaths (Libya: Civil War Casualties 2011). In this same timeframe, the UN estimated that 1,000 
Libyans had been killed (Downie 2011). These concerns and reports led to the turning of 
international opinion against the Gaddafi regime, and many believed that the regime had lost its 
legitimacy. The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) was one of the first international organizations 
to call for a peaceful resolution and a shift away from President Gaddafi (GCC 2011). Another 
factor contributing to the growing anti-Gaddafi sentiment was the rhetoric and questions of 
possible incitement by the Libyan government. President Gaddafi gave several speeches that 
referred to acts of suppression and killing that worried foreign leaders. One speech praised the 
infamous Tiananmen Square Massacre saying that national unity is “worth more than a small 
number of protesters.” Qaddafi’s rhetoric became even more inflammatory when he stated that 
“anyone who plays games with the country’s unity will be executed” (Libya protests: defiant 
Gaddafi refuses to quit 2011). Gaddafi continued this escalation of rhetoric in a televised speech 
as he directed his supporters to “come out of your homes and attack [the opposition] in their 
dens.” He also called the protesters “greasy rats” and “cockroaches,” eerily echoing the language 
used to incite violence during the Rwandan genocide (Stalinsky 2011). 
 Mounting fears of these speeches being more than just rhetoric galvanized both regional 
and international public support for taking action against the Libyan government. On March 
12th, the president of the NTC, Mustafa Abdel Jalil, warned that if Qaddafi’s forces were to 
successfully take Benghazi, the conflict could result in “the death of a half a million” people 
(McGreal 2011). These fears of a government-sponsored bloodbath were given credence by 
Qaddafi’s son and military commander, Saif al-Islam when he declared that “The military 
operations are finished. In 48 hours, everything will be over. Our forces are close to Benghazi” 
(UN chief calls for ceasefire 2011). These comments came on March 16th, one day before the 
UNSC passed Resolution 1973. But al-Islam continued to dismiss any concerns and UN action, 
saying that what “whatever decision is taken, it will be too late” (UN chief calls for ceasefire 
2011). The rhetoric the Qaddafis had used up to this point was unequivocally clear and 
influenced the leaders at the UNSC emergency meeting. The reports of the casualties and the 
fears of much greater loss of life garnered regional international support for immediate action to 
protect civilians and to intervene in Libya.  
 The protests in Syria began approximately one month after the protests in Libya, and the 
events in Libya likely had direct influence on the actions later decided upon in Syria. However, 
the emergence of conflicting reports in Syria, much like the ones coming out of Libya that 
proved to often be inaccurate or exaggerated and likely served to undermine the efforts to build 
support for similar pressure on the Syrian government. While the international community 
seemed hesitant to believe reports coming of Syria, the death toll did not initially escalate as 
rapidly at first as the situation in Libya. However, this difference should have quickly been 
dismissed as the violence in Syria began to escalate and sustain its unconscionable level of death 
and destruction. (Syria: 5000 dead in violence 2011). 
 The UN struggled to come to a consensus with respect to the course of action to be taken 
on Syria as the conflict intensified over the summer of 2011. Several members were unwilling to 
take actions such as a proposed arms embargo and targeted sanctions against governmental 
figures, fearing that such efforts would only foment sectarian civil war within the country 
(Adams 2015).  In October, Russia and China cast a rare double veto on the UNSC to block 
sanctions directed against the Assad government for its crackdown on the protests (Lynch 2011).
 The Russians feared that imposing sanctions may lead to eventual regime change and 
would increase tensions within the country. Despite the ever-worsening situation within Syria, 
the UN is continually blocked in its efforts to address the crisis in any significant way. 
Specifically, Russia and China have “on four separate occasions employed their vetoes to block 
action in response to mass atrocity crimes in Syria,” including an effort in a draft resolution to 
refer the situation to the International Criminal Court in May 2014 (Adams 2015). These vetoes 
enabled the Syrian regime to continue its campaigns to suppress dissent and blocked the 
international community’s path to action. 
Justification of Intervention in Libya and Failure to Act in Syria   
 It is difficult to understand how the international community could have acted so quickly 
in Libya, yet remain paralyzed and indecisive on Syria. The Syrian protest movement began 
almost exactly one month after that in Libya, and the protests spread rapidly across the country. 
After the government crackdown on protesters began, the death toll in Syria quickly outstripped 
the level of violence in Libya, yet no action was taken by the UNSC. Not even the use of 
chemical weapons mobilized the international community to intervene and end the bloodshed. 
This seeming failure to invoke R2P and end the bloodshed in Syria demonstrates the weaknesses 
of R2P and the current structure and criteria for intervention. 
 When considering the prospect of intervening in Libya, several organizations and leaders 
outlined their individual criteria for supporting intervention. NATO articulated its preconditions 
for intervention to be a “demonstrable need, a clear legal basis, and firm regional support” 
(NATO Says Preconditions Fulfilled 2011). NATO announced that the situation regarding Libya 
had met these conditions and that the use of force and the establishment of a NFZ was both 
justified and legal. The Obama Administration also gave its own criteria and required “local 
requests for intervention, regional legitimacy, legal legitimacy; and a truly multilateral coalition 
that shared the burden of costs” (Obama’s Libya Speech 2011). The Obama Administration 
chose to support the Libyan intervention as President Obama “authorized military action to stop 
the killing and enforce U.N. Security Council Resolution 1973” (Remarks by the President 
2011). The sources of legitimacy sought to develop international support and a coalition never 
materialized in Syria as they did in Libya.  
Gaining the regional support of the relevant international bodies is a crucial element to 
legitimizing intervention. While arguably not necessary, it serves to provide authority to 
international actors to address the global crises necessitating intervention. In Libya, after the 
Gulf Cooperation Council recognized the National Transitional Council on March 11, the GCC 
voiced its endorsement of a proposed No-Fly Zone (NFZ) and urged the UNSC to carry out the 
mandate of protecting civilians (GCC 2011). The next day, the Arab League unanimously voted 
to implement a NFZ over Libya under the auspices of humanitarian action. The secretary general 
of the Arab League, Amr Moussa, declared that the action was necessary for “supporting the 
Libyan people in their fight for freedom against a regime that is more and more disdainful” 
(Freeman 2011). Even the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), a 57-member state group, 
supported a NFZ intended to protect civilians from air raids conducted by the Gaddafi 
government forces (OIC Plans to Support 2011). This support helped the UN gain the consensus 
it needed to adopt UNSCR 1973 on March 17th, which it did unanimously with ten Security 
Council member countries voting in the affirmative, five abstaining, and none opposing. This 
resolution was expansive in its authorization of coalition intervention “excluding a foreign 
occupation force of any form on any part of Libyan territory” aimed at the protection of civilians 
(Libya: Nigeria Votes in Favor 2011). Despite worse conditions on the ground, the lack of 
political will and international legitimacy prevented any international intervention from taking 
place.  
 Two critical differences in the two cases concerned regional support for intervention, and 
calls for international intervention. For example, while the Arab League agreed that the crisis in 
Libya was unacceptable and called for intervention, it failed to do the same in Syria (Doyle 
2011).  The failure to build a legitimate and legal basis for greater international involvement in 
the Syrian crisis enabled the crisis to devolve into a civil war that claimed the lives of hundreds 
of thousands. Even though the regional support was not present in Syria as it was in Libya’s 
case, the Arab League did begin calling for stronger international involvement in 2013 after the 
use of chemical weapons (Arab League Urges UN-Backed Action 2013). The international 
efforts to relieve the crisis in Syria faced greater political and legal challenges than the 
intervention in Syria. The political paralysis and failure to act allowed the situation to devolve 
into the current state of sectarian conflict bordering on a failed state. The necessity to develop 
new methods of addressing crises to avoid the same pitfalls and paralysis of the Syrian crisis is 
essential to guaranteeing the future security of the individuals that doctrines such as the 
Responsibility to Protect are designed to establish, yet fail to achieve. 
 The situation in Syria presented a clear humanitarian disaster that required international 
effort to address. The failure of the UN Security Council and regional groups to advocate for 
cohesive action demonstrated the weakness of the UN to uphold its mandate to preserve peace 
and security. The failure to protect the civilian population from the large-scale destruction and 
violence in Syria raises questions about the future of interventionist policies and how to best 
respond to the emergency crises that threaten the innocent.  
 The examination of these case studies and the responses of both the international 
community and the US government can help inform future crisis management. The criteria to 
intervene in Libya led to a muddled outcome that remains unresolved, while the failure to 
implement R2P in Syria has allowed the situation to spiral info full-scale civil war with no 
immediate or clear resolution. Learning from the factors that prevented the international 
community from acting in Syria can inform future decisions when faced with crises that may call 
for intervention.  
Intervention in Iraq and the shifting dynamics 
a) US-Led Intervention in Iraq: Sinjar Mountains 
The US intervened in Iraq in 2014 as the Islamic State threatened to massacre a group of 
Yazidis fleeing conflict. The Islamic State emerged as a powerful Sunni militant group that 
established itself in parts of Iraq and Syria, and shocked the world with its rapid expansion and 
brutal tactics. The current conflict is a multi-faceted one, as the Islamic State is fighting the 
Shi’ite-controlled governments of Iraq and Syria, the Kurds in both Iraq and Syria, and several 
rival rebel factions inside of Syria, while simultaneously committing atrocities against minorities 
and groups that they declare to be in opposition to the stated beliefs of the Islamic State. The 
Islamic State has also “proclaimed a ‘caliphate’ ruling over all Muslims, slaughtered prisoners 
and ordered Shi'ites and non-Muslims to convert or die,” causing many nations to become 
concerned with the current state and development of this insurgency group (Mohammed and 
Perry 2014). This conflict became the focus of international intervention when the Islamic State 
pushed into the Northern regions of Iraq and threatened to massacre the thousands of Yazidis 
fleeing the conflict. The Islamic State had already killed hundreds of Yazidis and were 
threatening to continue their campaign of violence, creating the potential for another mass 
atrocity echoing the tragedies of Rwanda and Srebrenica (Roberts 2016). As the initial impetus 
for the United States’ involvement in the conflict was of humanitarian concerns, the similarities 
of the justification for the intervention to the criteria outlined by the Responsibility to Protect 
were apparent during this US action (Solomon 2014). This use of force was approved by the 
government in Baghdad, giving clear cover and legitimacy to the operation through the support 
of the Iraqi government (Solomon 2014). This initial intervention followed the criteria of a 
second-pillar intervention under the Responsibility to Protect. In August of 2014, President 
Barack Obama authorized "targeted airstrikes" to protect the Yazidis trapped in the Sinjar 
mountains and to break the siege of the Islamic State (Johnson 2014). The US also delivered 
food and water through airdrops to the refugees trapped on top of the mountain after the 
President’s dramatic statement that "America is coming to help" (Johnson 2014). This policy 
signals the start of an intervention, as the US had not had a military presence in Iraq since the last 
American troops left Iraq at the end of 2011 (Cooper 2014). The US deployed Marines and 
special forces troops to Mount Sinjar in Iraq to “assess options for a potential rescue of Yazidi 
civilians threatened by Islamic extremists and worn down by lack of food” (Chulov 2014). 
However, this intervention was not solely made up of US forces and Iraqi consent. The military 
coalition was composed of “armed forces from the United States, United Kingdom, and 
Australian governments, supported by other members of the international community” (Roberts 
2016). These multilateral actions involved coalition aircraft dropping “food, water, and portable 
shelter” to assist the refugees in response to the emergency posed by militants from the Islamic 
State and the living conditions endured by the Yazidis (Roberts 2016). On August 14, the siege 
of Mount Sinjar was broken through the efforts of coalition forces and thousands of Yazidi 
refugees escaped from the danger (Roberts 2016).  
b) Implications for the future of intervention 
President Obama subsequently “sought to rally international support for a military 
coalition against Islamic State” that would work together to suppress the international threat that 
IS poses to the world (Hogg and Salman 2014). This coalition gained momentum and 
accumulated impressive support, as several European nations and some Sunni-led Arab States 
joined in the campaign against IS in Iraq (Hogg and Salman 2014). The influence of the United 
States on global affairs is in prominent view in a situation like this, and the potential to establish 
the protections of R2P are critical to the prevention of future mass atrocities.  
As the Islamic State grows in both size and power, the global community faces a crisis 
that demands a response on a global scale. The Americans have recruited and led a powerful 
coalition in order to resolve the crisis in the Middle East collectively with the joint efforts of 
Arab States and European allies. While current action by the United States may be representative 
of a broad coalition, there is still the question of adherence to international law. Only the Iraqi 
government has requested assistance from foreign governments to confront the threat of the 
Islamic State within their country, and this is why international action has been more 
successfully implemented in Iraq while several nations are hesitant to commit support to 
operations conducted inside of Syria. This aspect of the operation is made more complex by the 
fact that the United States hopes to mitigate the Islamic State in Syria, but does not wish to help 
the Assad regime to remain in power and hopes that other moderate groups will eventually be 
able to take on a larger role within Syria (Hogg and Salman 2014). This discrepancy may not be 
a result of disregarding international law, however, as much as a political statement or 
operational necessity of not coordinating with the despotic Assad regime. The United States has 
been supporting the democratically elected government for years in response to the threat of the 
Islamic State, sending first advisers and then conducting tactical airstrikes to help control the 
situation. The Obama Administration has been clear in its view that this is not America’s fight 
alone, but requires action on behalf of numerous actors, especially the Iraqi government. The 
goal is to have the Iraqi people fight for and protect their country and their federal government, 
and the United States’ actions are purely in support of these actions. This multilateral 
coordination led by the United States could be a true example of nations working together to 
achieve a common good in the greater security of the world by reducing the power and the threat 
posed by the Islamic State.  
The threat the Islamic State poses is extremely real, and the states that have decided to 
participate in the coalition have a committed responsibility to global security, and so they cannot 
stand by and leave the United States to conduct the massive operation and uphold the 
international standards of atrocity prevention by itself. The US invoked the same principles 
behind the doctrine of the Responsibility to Protect during this humanitarian intervention, but 
failed to articulate support for the developing norm as justification. This lapse undermines the 
future of humanitarian intervention efforts, and the US needs to continue operations in Iraq to 
fulfill the mandates of R2P and ensure that threatened groups do not fall victims to the existential 
threats they face from the Islamic State. In this instance, closer adherence to the ideals of the 
Responsibility to Protect would have made this operation a bigger success and continued to 
guarantee the protection of endangered groups within Iraq.  
IV. Implications 
Current Framework  
 The cases examined above offer lessons that can be applied to inform the future decisions 
to intervene. Critical to the analysis is the justification and legitimacy of the interventions and 
why the US decided to support or refuse to commit to intervention efforts. While the Libyan 
intervention involved widespread international support and legitimacy, the results were not a 
clear or rapid victory. The aversion to commit to state-building, involving security operations 
and the development of a government structure, hampered the implementation of R2P and thus 
the invoking of the norm in future interventions. The positive results from the intervention was a 
standard to invoke R2P, even if the language surrounding it was limited and not a complete 
application of the doctrine. The support from the UN Security Council, the Arab League, NATO, 
and other international actors demonstrated how the international community can act quickly and 
theoretically in the interest of preserving human rights.  
 These gains were not only muted by the failure to commit to the rebuilding of Libya and 
allowing it to fall into factional conflict, but also by failure to end the escalating conflict within 
Syria. The continual failure to act to end the violence in Syria demonstrated the weaknesses of 
R2P and how the desire to protect civilians is secondary to the political interests of global 
powers. The failures in Syria cannot be remedied unless there are changes to either R2P or the 
process for implementing intervention. These necessary reforms are the subject of the rest of this 
paper. 
 The case of the intervention in Iraq in 2014 is a different case. While still falling under 
the mandate of R2P, the intervention had the local support of the Iraqi government. This element 
allowed foreign powers to combat the Islamic State and fulfill the ideals promoted by the 
Responsibility to Protect. This instance shows how the calls to protect human rights can be 
answered, even if the execution is imperfect. The commitment to this intervention could have 
been more robust, and the initial goals shifted as the US and coalition efforts shifted to push back 
the Islamic State. In this case, the standards within R2P offered legitimacy to the initial 
intervention, but a closer adherence to the provisions and commitments inherent to the R2P 
doctrine would have ensured that the protection of human rights continued.  
Policy implications  
This analysis leads to the suggestions for reform and how the future of R2P can fit into 
the US foreign policy grand strategy. The conclusions from examining these case studies is: 
Embracing R2P would improve the success of US-backed interventions, but more changes are 
also necessary to create an environment where intervention can be a tool for global security and 
regional stability.  
The issues with developing a uniform policy on intervention are multiple and complex. 
There are various dynamics that cause intervention to fail or to never occur in the first place, and 
so a variety of reforms are necessary to best equip the US and its allies as it moves to create a 
more secure world. These suggestions for reform involve a formal adoption of the Responsibility 
to Protect and a commitment to the just application of the doctrine when human rights are 
threatened. These reforms also involve the alteration of the process for intervention, involving 
UN approval and coalition support. The structure for UN approval must be improved to ensure 
that there are no more failures to act when there is a clear mandate to prevent future violence and 
large scale loss of life. By making these reforms, the US could promote a more stable and 
protected world, while building on the promises to end the mass atrocities that haunt the global 
community. 
a) Endorsement and adoption of R2P 
 The endorsement of R2P by the United States government through the UN or 
congressional ratification could offer the US more legitimacy to intervene in some cases and may 
in turn lead to a more stable post-intervention state. This reform’s potential benefits can be 
examined through the case in Libya. If a broader mandate of R2P had been implemented, the 
unity government may have succeeded and prevented the factionalism and strife that plagues 
Libya. The Responsibility to Protect includes a level of commitment to the rebuilding of the 
nation where the intervention occurs, and this is critical to the long-term stability of countries 
that have endured the intervention of the international powers. This promise to commit to state 
building after an intervention was never implemented, and as it is a key component of a fully-
invoked R2P, perhaps a broader mandate could have make the intervention a success. 
This adoption would have also helped in the case of Iraq, as the commitment to 
rebuilding and the continued protection of threatened communities was not clear or completely 
fulfilled by US and coalition efforts. The continued adherence to the promises of R2P will give 
threatened communities hope and protection, and give leaders more reason to promote 
observance of human rights within their borders. The Responsibility to Protect has the power to 
transform the current dynamics of sovereignty and international responsibility, and by promoting 
these ideals, the US would help build a more stable and safe world. 
The US endorsement of R2P involves the full endorsement of all three pillars, 
recognizing that there is a mandate to protect people threatened by a mass atrocity, especially 
when there is support from regional or local bodies. The National Security Council should 
prioritize cases involving potential mass atrocities and human rights violations, and be prepared 
to recommend actions to the President. To fully endorse the goals or R2P, the US government 
should also direct the relevant departments, such as the Department of Treasury and the 
Department of Justice to counter states or organizations that may perpetrate mass atrocities. 
These efforts should also include an international dynamic, pushing UN members to adopt a 
more formal and robust commitment to the Responsibility to Protect. The US could also 
influence NATO to promise troop commitments to actions sanctioned under R2P to guarantee 
that actions taken have the capability and manpower to effectively implement the interventions. 
The implementation of these measure would enable the international community to more readily 
endorse actions through the Responsibility to Protect and contribute to a more stable a 
prosperous world. 
b) UN reform 
 The proposal of reforms to the UN’s process of endorsing military intervention to try and 
mitigate the influence of geopolitics and individual national interests is crucial to the future 
success of intervention within states that do not approve international action. This process could 
be in the form of a new body within the UN for the sole purpose of intervention, or with a 
restructuring of the UNSC where in cases of intervention the council could override vetoes with 
a 2/3 majority.  
Critical to understanding the process leading to action by the Security Council is 
examining the current framework and process that leads to the intervention by UN-sanctioned 
forces. The decision to authorize the use of force by state actors and intergovernmental 
organizations such as NATO lies predominantly with the Security Council of the UN. This 
council is made up of the five permanent members, and ten non-permanent members elected to 
two-year terms and representing various geographical zones around the world. The Security 
Council is the arm of the United Nations that is responsible for addressing crises and preserving 
international peace and global security. In the instance of a crisis, it is the Security Council’s 
mandate to determine the course of action to be taken. In the instance that the Security Council 
rejects a proposal or fails to address a crisis, then there are a few recourses where action may still 
be justified under the legal authority of the UN Charter. The first of these is that the 
consideration of the matter can be referred to the General Assembly in an Emergency Special 
Session under the "Uniting for Peace" procedure and put to a vote. The other option is that 
military action can be authorized by a regional or sub-regional organization within the area of 
jurisdiction using the justification of Chapter VIII of the Charter. This course of action is still 
subject to a subsequent authorization from the Security Council, but it does improve the chance 
and support for international action (International Commission CFR 2001).  
 This structure has succeeded in authorizing various peacekeeping missions, the 
imposition of sanctions, and the justification of force in several scenarios, but the framework still 
has weaknesses that result in the failure to execute the important mandate for the UNSC. The 
reality of deadlock within the UNSC and the veto power wielded by the five permanent members 
limits the effectiveness of the UN to address all the crises it faces. The UN also does not have its 
own forces and must rely on governments to provide personnel to carry out the missions it 
approves. The limitations of the structure of the UN can restrict or paralyze its capacity to 
respond.  
New Hierarchy and Structure of R2P 
 The weaknesses of the UNSC threaten the continued security of the world and the 
potential to promote a truly protected populace. The dangers of inaction in crisis scenarios that 
require a rapid response are too great a threat to refuse an updated structure to address the issues. 
The potential for deadlock and the power of the veto by the P5 necessitates the development of a 
new procedure that can bypass the political limitations of the Security Council. A new policy to 
intervene on a limited scale to attempt to prevent the drastic escalation of violence and extreme 
loss of life could serve to better prevent the episodes of mass atrocities that the international 
community has agreed are unconscionable.  
 A new council within the UN that is responsible for monitoring critical situations around 
the world that may necessitate humanitarian intervention could promote awareness and facilitate 
the necessary action required to prevent atrocities. This council would identify the critical cases 
and recommend interventions to the UN Security Council. The new “Humanitarian Response 
Council” would have the ability to recommend uses of force to the UNSC. This council would 
consist of a panel of experts and academics appointed by the UN Human Rights Council and 
confirmed by the UN General Assembly. After action has been recommended to the UNSC, the 
council would then vote on the issue and whether to recommend intervention with a 2/3 majority. 
This action negates the weakness of the UN Security Council and the veto power wielded by the 
P5 that often paralyzes the UN from taking action.  
V. Conclusion and Potential Reforms 
 The UN will not be able to stop all of the future atrocities or always undertake the best 
course of action during future crises. However, the reforming and updating of framework for 
humanitarian intervention can equip the UN to be more prepared and more effective in taking 
action for the purpose of mitigating humanitarian and often man-made disasters. The political 
cost may be high, and the moral questions will plague future interventions and the development 
of unforeseen consequences that make governments and leaders hesitate to become involved. 
Improving the framework does not require intervention in every scenario, but should instead be 
reserved for clear cases of intervention with a legal authorization from the UN. These changes 
may not result in the abolition of gross, systematic human rights abuses against civilian 
populations, but it does offer real tools that can be utilized to achieve this end. 
 The combination of UN reform along with the strong endorsement of the Responsibility 
to Protect would better prepare the international community to respond to the various challenges 
and dangers around the world. These changes would strengthen intervention efforts and make the 
approved interventions have a better chance of operational success and saving lives.  
Policy Implications and Recommendations 
 The US embracing the tenants of R2P and the suggestions outlined in this paper would 
help US intervention efforts to be more successful. The US should refrain from acting 
unilaterally, instead relying on the approval of the UNSC and other international actors, and 
should consider the local or regional support for action. The reforms to US foreign policy as well 
as to the structure of the UN would enable a more effective procedure for the effective and 
positive interventions in the future. While this policy would may not answer every crisis that 
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